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We consider an MNC that is originated from a developed country where income is more 
or less evenly distributed and serves there a high quality product with the help of 
sophisticated technology of production. Under liberalized policy this MNC enters into a 
developing economy where income distribution is highly unequal. Due to prior experience 
of production it possesses a cost advantage in producing appropriate product quality in the 
developing country described by the spillover effect. It is shown that this discriminating 
monopolist serves a lower quality product in the developing country without any cost 
advantage. This happens due to its uneven income distribution. As spillover effect starts to 
rise, the product qualities between the countries differentiate more. At the same time profit 
of MNC rises. This may provide an explanation why MNCs are so eager to enter into a 
developing country. The developing country also gains in terms of welfare. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Under liberalization, entry of a foreign multinational in a developing country has 
been easy. There is a general expectation that the developing countries will now benefit 
from the introduction of new and superior quality products by the foreign multinationals. 
The developing countries are commonly characterized by high income inequality 
distribution as compared to the developed countries. At the same time the average 
purchasing power of the general people in a developing (local) country is lower than that 
of a developed (foreign) country. A question then asked in this context is: Will a foreign 
multinational supply the same product quality in the developing country as being served 
in it’s parent (foreign) country? It is often contended that the foreign multinationals 
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supply a lower quality product in the developing countries (Das, 1998). Computers sold 
by IBM, Compaq or cold drinks serves by Coca-Cola in USA and in South Asia may 
exemplify such quality differences. 
There is a literature on endogenous product quality choice by a monopolist in a 
model of vertical product differentiation with heterogeneous preference or taste of the 
consumers. Mussa and Rosen (1978) show that a monopolist adopts different 
price-quality combinations for heterogeneous set of consumers who have different tastes 
and so have different willingness to pay for the product. A consumer with higher 
willingness to pay for a quality prefers a higher quality product. Kim and Kim (1996) 
assume that the cost of producing a lower quality is lower due to spill-over effect, that is, 
the experience gathered by the firm for producing a higher quality good. Tirole (1988), 
Choi and Shin (1992), Motta (1993), Wauthy (1996) and Acharyya (1998, 2005) also 
deal with the choice of product quality, given heterogeneity in taste or preference. In 
these models, consumers are indexed by a taste parameter and it is uniformly distributed 
within a given range. 
Then Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) have analyzed the effect of income distribution 
on a vertically differentiated duopoly model. They assume that the marginal 
willing-to-pay for a higher quality increases with the income level of a consumer. 
However, these models including Saked and Satton (1982) assume uniform distribution 
of income. 
We extend this literature to find an explanation of the above mentioned fact and to 
determine the product quality served by a multinational firm in a developing country 
where uneven pattern of income distribution prevails. 
In the present paper I assume that a consumer with a higher income has higher 
willingness to pay for quality and prefers a high quality product. Then the distribution of 
the taste or preference of consumers is conditional upon the distribution of income. A 
multinational firm originated from a developed (foreign) country enters into a 
developing (local) country and serves a product not produced there. The firm has an 
experience of producing a high product quality in its own (parent) country where income 
is more or less evenly distributed. But the income distribution in the local country is 
highly uneven, namely  positively skewed. Since the firm has a prior experience of 
producing the product with sophisticated technology, it can now reduce the cost of 
production in the local country due to spillovers of production knowledge. Lemi (2004) 
discusses that the economists are not unanimous about the spillover effect of foreign 
direct investment on host country’s economy. But in this paper I assume positive 
spillover because the MNC here is transmitting its own production knowledge from its 
old plant in own country to a new plant established in local country. It is assumed that 
the MNC has monopoly in both the foreign country market and the local country market. 
However it behaves as a  multi-product and discriminating monopolist which adopts 
different price-quality combinations for two different markets. Under this scenario, the 
basic objective in this paper is to determine the product qualities served by the MNC in 
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monopolist will determine the equilibrium price-quality combinations for two markets 
which maximize its total profit. The equilibrium is solved in two stages; in the first stage 
the firm determines the price-quality combination of the product for the foreign market.   
Then given the spillover effect, it determines the price and quality of the product for the 
local market. 
The work closely related to mine is the paper by Chatterjee and Raychaudhuri (2004). 
The focus of their paper is to discuss how a change in income distribution parameter 
affects the number of product qualities served by the firms in both monopoly and 
duopoly market structures. They assume that the market is always endogenously covered 
and show that a monopolist supplies high and low qualities simultaneously if at least a 
certain degree of inequality exists. Given the income range, as income inequality is 
reduced below this level the monopolist supplies only the high quality product.   
But in the present paper income distributions in two countries remain fixed and 
market is not endogenously covered. Market sizes in two countries are determined 
according to profit maximization of the MNC. This paper discusses the effect of income 
distribution on the quality of good it self, not the number of qualities served by the 
monopolist. The results derived in this paper are the following: 
(1) The MNC always serves high quality product in the developed country where 
income is evenly distributed and low quality product in the developing country where 
income distribution is uneven. Uneven income distribution in the developing country is 
the motivating factor to serve a lower product quality there. 
(2) Spillovers of production knowledge only intensifies the degree of difference 
between the product qualities served to the countries. The higher the spillover effect, the 
higher will be the product quality and the lower will be the market size in foreign 
country. In local country the opposite happens. Lower will be the product quality and 
higher will be the market size. At the same time total profit of the MNC will increase. 
This has a policy implication from the welfare point of view in the developing 
country. Some people in the local country will now enjoy the product which was not 
previously produced there. Obviously welfare of the country will increase. Suppose that 
there are more than one competitive entrant with different spillover effects. Then the 
question is which MNC or MNCs be preferred from the welfare point of view. Our 
paper provides a direction to that question. We show that the higher the spillover effect 
of producing the product in a developing country, the higher will be the welfare of that 
country. This type of welfare analysis is not considered in any other works.   
The intuition of these results may be the following. The cost of producing a quality 
in a developing country gets reduced due to spillover effect. The strategy of the MNC is 
to shift some part of the market from the developed country to the developing country. 
Given the income distribution structures, the MNC may capture a larger market size in 
the developing country by slight reduction of that in the developed country and in this 
way it increases total profit. This may be an answer why the MNCs are so eager to enter 
into the markets of the developing countries. Obviously there is a limit to the increase in 
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coverage. Again there must be some market in the developed country because 
production of a high quality product creates spillover effect. 
Plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides the model. In subsection 2.1 
we discusses the income distribution structures in each country, the preference function 
of the consumers and the monopolist’s cost function. Subsection 2.2 determines the 
equilibrium price-quality combinations adopted by the monopolist in two countries. In 
subsection 2.3 we present the simulation results. In subsection 2.4 an example is 
considered. An impact of a change in spillover effect on welfare of the local country is 
analysed in section 3. Finally, section 4 provides some concluding remarks. All 
mathematical derivations are relegated to the appendix.   
 
 
2.  MODEL 
 
2.1.    Description of Income Distribution, Preference and Cost Structure 
 
Income Distribution Structure 
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The local country’s population is identified by the income index  , which is 









,   . The population density function defined 
over it is    f   and the simplest characterization of uneven income distribution implies 
 0   f . As   increases income per person increases but the number of people 
eating such income goes down. We further assume 
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Figure 1b.    Income Distribution in Foreign Country SOMA ROY  66
Preference Structure 
 
We assume that preference pattern of the consumers for the product in either country 
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where each consumer consumes only one unit of a vertically differentiated good. The 
quality of the good is indexed by    q q , 0    is observable to all. The range of possible 
qualities is determined by state of existing technology.   represents the consumer’s 
taste for quality. All consumers prefer high quality for a given price; however a 
consumer with higher income is more willing to pay to obtain high quality.    may be 
thought as the inverse of marginal rate of substitution between income and quality. So a 
wealthier consumer has a lower marginal utility of money or equivalently, a higher   . 
So the taste parameter is assumed to be the function of income of the individual - the 
higher the income of the consumer, the higher the preference is for high quality, that is, 
 ,        0    . However, we simplify the relation and assume   
 
     .                                                       ( 5 )  
 
Therefore, for the marginal income class    0 ,    say  who is indifferent between 
buying the product quality  q  and retaining income, the following condition holds 
 
 p q   0   , or  p q  0  .                                            ( 6 )  
 
Let the income of a person belonging to the  th   class is     y  and we index it 
such a way that   0   y . A consumer with income index  j    can afford to pay   
 
if  p y j  .
2                                                        ( 7 )  
 
This is consumer’s budget or purchasing power constraint. Maximum quality,  q  is 
sufficiently high such that consumer with highest income level is willing to pay his 
 
1 Tirole (1988) introduces this type of utility function. 
2  There are a large number of functions for which this holds. The examples may be   3    y , 
   e y  . However, for   2    y , the simulation results presented in Table 1 will not hold. INCOME DISTRIBUTION, SPILLOVER EFFECTS  67
entire income to obtain it, i.e., 
 
 q y    . 
 
Hence, the purchasing power constraint is non-binding for a consumer since the 
reservation price for the top most quality is less than or equal to his income: 
 




Let the unit cost of producing a quality,  q ˆ  in the foreign country is    q c ˆ  which  is 
convex upward. We then assume that if the MNC starts production in local country 
setting a new plant, it will possess a cost advantage. Valuable knowledge obtained from 
the production of certain quality of a good can be usefully transplanted into the 
production of the same good but of different qualities in the form of reduced cost; we 
call this phenomenon as spillover effect.
3 Unit cost of producing a quality,  q in the  
local country is described by 
 
     , ˆ ~ q q a q c q c      0  a , for  q q ˆ  ,                                  ( 8 )  
  
where  a is the spillover parameter. This means production of higher quality good in 
the foreign country creates a positive spillover in the form of reduced cost of a lower 
quality product in the local country. It will be shown later that  0 for        ˆ   a q q . Hence 
the production requires some fixed set up cost. Let us assume that this fixed cost is so 
small that net profit is always positive. This does not change our results and thus the 
associated fixed cost is assumed away. Let the cost function of the MNC in foreign 
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where  x ˆ  is the output produced in the foreign country. Then the cost function in the 
local country will be 
 
3 When a firm has product specific knowledge, it wants to engage in Greenfield DFI (setting a new plant) 
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where  x  is output produced there. 
 
2.2.    Choice of Qualities by the MNC 
 
Let us assume that the multinational firm was initially operating only in the 
developed foreign country. And now it enters the developing country to serve the same 
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The corresponding profit expressions in the two markets are 
 
    S S q c p F    , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0   , 
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0 S q c p L   , 
 
where  F   and  L   are profits from the foreign market and local market. These 
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The problem of the monopolist is to choose product qualities and the income indices 
of the marginal income classes in two countries so as to maximize total profit. Then the 
equilibrium product price and the market size in each country are determined.   
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2.3.  Equilibrium Product Quality and Income Index of the Marginal Income 
Classes in Two Countries 
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Hence the two markets are interdependent for  0  a . For  0  a  markets are 
separated. Here two stage solution procedure is used.  In the first stage we solve 
equilibrium values of product quality and marginal income class for the foreign country. 
In the second stage equilibrium for the local country is solved. I consider the second 




In this stage equilibrium we determine the optimum product quality and the income 
index of the marginal income class in the local country given the foreign product quality 
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where 
* q  and 
*
0   are optimal quality and income index of marginal income class in 
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The stability condition is assumed to hold, 
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Later we show that these are actually satisfied SOMA ROY  70
Lemma 1:  The higher the product quality in the foreign country, the lower is the 
equilibrium product quality in the local country and the larger is the corresponding 
market size. 
 




















.                                              (19) 
 
The economic intuition is the following. Given the spillover parameter, increase in 
the foreign product quality results in decrease in unit cost of producing the same quality 
in the local country. So marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost (MR>MC). In order to 
maximize profit firm will produce more, i.e., the local market size will increase till   
MR=MC. As a result in equilibrium both 
*
0   and 
* q  will decrease simultaneously, 
i.e., the firm will serve lower product quality to larger population coming from lower 
income group. 
 
Lemma 2:  The higher the spillover parameter, the lower will be the equilibrium 
product quality and the larger will be the market size in local country. 
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Given the foreign product quality, as spillover parameter increases, the unit cost of 
producing the same quality in local country will decrease due to spillover effects. So the 
firm will produce more till MR=MC. As a result equilibrium product quality and 




In this stage given the spillover parameter, the MNC will choose the product quality 
and the marginal income class for the foreign country so that total profit is maximized 
subject to the first order conditions given in (15) and (16). The first order conditions for 
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  0 ˆ ˆ ˆ * * * *
0    aS S q  ,                                                ( 2 2 )  
 
where 
* ˆ q  and  0
* ˆ   are optimal quality and income index of marginal income class in 
foreign country. The Second order and stability conditions are assumed to be satisfied, 
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Later we show that these are actually satisfied.   
 
Proposition 1:    The higher the spillover parameter, 
 
(1) the higher will be the product quality and the lower will be the market size in the 
foreign country, and     
(2) the lower will be the product quality and the higher will be the market size in the 
local country. 
 
Proof:  (a) From the comparative static exercise we get (see Appendix 3): 
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As spillover parameter increases, monopolist’s optimal strategy is to raise the 
product quality to serve a smaller number of people in the foreign country and to reduce SOMA ROY  72
quality and enhance the market in the local country. Given the characteristics of income 
distribution structures, the MNC is able to capture a larger market in the local country 
compared to the reduction of that in the foreign country. 
 
Proposition 2:  An increase in spillover effect will increase the total profit of the 
MNC.  
 
Proof :   0 ˆ
ˆ 2 *
* *
*   







. (see  Appendix  4)              (27) 
 
As the spillover parameter takes a larger value, the MNC shifts a part of the market 
from the foreign country to the local country. As a result profits from the foreign market 
reduces where as, that from the local market would increase. The latter will outweigh the 
former and the total profit of the MNC will go up. Of course, profits can not increase 
further once the full market coverage is reached in the local market. 
 
2.4.  Simulation  Results 
 
In this section we determine equilibrium values of the variables through simulation 
for specific values of the spillover parameter (i.e., a).  
 
2.4.1.    Equilibrium Product Quality, Market Size and Price for  0  a  
 
When there is no spillover effect, i.e.,  0  a , two markets are completely separated. 
 
 
Equilibrium in Local Country 
 
Hence from (15) and (16) we obtain after substitution  0  a.  
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Now, let us assume following (3) 
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or, 5 . 0 log 1    , or,  6376 . 1   . 
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2 * * * 68 . 2     q p .              ( 3 1 )  
 
 
Equilibrium in Foreign Market 
 








0   

  ,                                       ( 3 2 a )  
 
and 0 ˆ ˆ * *
0  q  .                                                   ( 3 2 b )  
 
Now, substituting (32b) in (32a) we obtain 
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Finally, for the foreign country
5 
 
526 . 0 ˆ*  S ,    8 . 1
* *   q , and 
2 * * * 24 . 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ     q p .                      ( 3 3 )  
 
Diagrammatic representation, of the equilibriums are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2a.    Equilibrium in Local Country with No Spillovers 
 
 
Figure 2b.    Equilibrium in Foreign Country with No Spillovers 
 
























 and    0
ˆ
- ˆ 3   
k
S
  . INCOME DISTRIBUTION, SPILLOVER EFFECTS  75
Observation 1:  It is the uneven income distribution structure in the local country 
which motivates the MNC to serve there a lower product, not the cost advantage it 
possesses. 
 
(31) and (33) show the effect of income distribution on the product quality served to 
a countries by the MNC. For the same marginal income class in both countries, the 
monopolist covers a larger market (market size is measured from the upper end of the 
income class) in the foreign country than that in the local country due to the difference 
in income distribution structures. Hence in order to maximize total profit, the 
discriminating monopolist serves a higher product quality to the higher income group in 
the foreign country compared to that in the local country. Thus the higher the income 
inequality in a country, the lower will be the product quality served by the MNC. 
 
2.4.2.    Equilibrium Product Quality, Market Size and Price for  0  a  
 
For positive spillovers, i.e.,  0  a , two markets are completely interdependent. 
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This boils down to, after substituting from (16) and (21) 
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* ˆ 2 ˆ 3 S aS     .                                                 ( 3 5 )  
 
For a given value of  a, we may determine two unknowns 
* ˆ   and 
*   from (34) 
and (35). 
To simplify, let us consider all the variables in terms of   . Following Proposition 1 
we assume the income index of marginal income class in the local country is lower and SOMA ROY  76
that for the foreign country is higher under positive spillover than the corresponding 
values with zero spillover parameter. Now we may write following (31) and (33) 
 
   
* ,  6376 . 1 1                                             ( 3 6   i )  
 
   
* ˆ ,  7 . 2 8 . 1   ,                                            ( 3 6   i i )  
 
   a , 0   .                                                   ( 3 6   i i i )  
 
Condition (34) boils down to, after substitution from (3), (30), (36 i-iii) 
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Now we use (37) and (38) for simulation process to determine 
*
0   and 
*
0 ˆ   for 
specific values of  a. Simulation results for different values of  a  are given in Table 1. 
It can be easily checked that the second order and stability conditions are satisfied for 
these values of the variables given  a. It may be noted that   2 .  a   corresponds to the 
full market coverage in the local country. Clearly simulation results confirm Proposition 




a  0  0.059  0.108  0.164  0.2  
* ˆ    1.8  1.82  1.84  1.87  1.95  
* ˆ q   1.8  1.88  1.96  2.08  2.4  
* ˆ p  3.24
2   3.42
2  3.61
2  3.89
2   4.68
2   
* ˆ S   0.529 0.5176  0.5059  0.4882  0.4417 
*    1.6376  1.6057  1.5495  1.4548  1.0073  
* q   1.6376  1.5467  1.4414  1.2908  0.8073  
* p  2.68
2   2.48
2  2.23
2  1.88
2   0.81
2   
* S   0.5 0.5264  0.5621  0.6251  0.9926 1   
   1.5256
2   1.5444
2  1.5552
2  1.5769
2   1.5941
2   INCOME DISTRIBUTION, SPILLOVER EFFECTS  77
Observation 2: Increase in spillover of knowledge (to produce a lower product 
quality) only magnifies the degree of quality differential served to the countries. 
 
Table 1 shows the effect of increase in spillover parameter on equilibrium product 
qualities and the prices, marginal income classes and market sizes in two countries and 
lastly on total profit of MNC. As spillover of knowledge (in terms of cost reduction for 
producing a lower product quality) increases, MNC raises foreign product quality by 
raising its price and serves much lower product quality at lower price in the local 
country. Hence the difference between the qualities intensifies. As a result market size in 
foreign country shrinks and that in the local country spreads. Since income distribution 
in local country is uneven, reduction of market size is over compensated by its 
enlargement in the local country 
 
2.5.  Example 
 
In this subsection I construct a simple example where it can be readily verified that 




3    y ,   0   y . 
 
The PP constraint is satisfied for the consumer with income index  ,  




* p y   .                                                         ( 3 9 )  
 
This is for the consumers in local country. For a foreign consumer with income 
index   ˆ ,   
* ˆ ˆ     it  becomes 
 
 
* ˆ ˆ p y   .                                                          ( 4 0 )  
 
It can be checked from Table 1 that for every considered value of spillover 
parameter,  a 
 
* 3 * ˆ ˆ p   , and 
* 3 * p   . 
 
Thus the PP constraint is satisfied for marginal income class in both countries. 
Obviously for higher income classes it must satisfy. 
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3.  WELFARE  ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we analyse the effect of change in spillovers on the welfare of the 
local country. We assume that the MNC takes out the whole profit from the local 
country. Hence the aggregate social welfare in the local country from this product is the     




The total CS from the product is then given by: 
 


































0 q   is the price of the product and a consumer with income index   is 
willing to pay the amount 
* q  . 























.                                            ( 4 2 )  
 
The first term in the R.H.S. of the above expression is the direct effect of an increase 

































      
The first term in the R.H.S. of the above expression accounts for the loss in CS of 
the consumers who previously were buying the higher quality product and the second 
term accounts for the gain in CS due to price reduction as more people from lower 
income class are buying the product now. Consumer surplus of new consumers is 
positive. We finally get (see Appendix 5) 
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From the simulation results given in section 2.4, we can easily check that both first 
term and second term in the bracket is negative whatever be the value of  a. Thus the 
direct effect of an increase in spillover parameter is positive. An increase in spillover 
effect results in a reduction in cost of producing the quality in the local country. Hence, 
the firm will produce more of the good to serve the population coming from the lower 


































The first term in the R.H.S. in the above expression accounts for the loss of CS of 
the consumers due to a lower quality and the second term accounts for the gain in CS 
due to an increase in market size. 
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From the simulation results given in section 2.4, again we can check that the first 
term in the multiplication is negative. The second term is negative (see (19)) but the 
third term is positive (see (24)). The net indirect effect of an increase in spillover 
parameter is also positive. As spillover parameter increases, the monopolist’s strategy is 
to uplift foreign product quality because increase in quality difference reduces the cost 
of producing a given quality in the local country. Thus as spillover effect increases, 
indirect effect adds weight to direct effect in making positive impact on consumer 
surplus. 
 
Proposition 3:  The higher the spillover effect on producing the local product 
quality, the higher will be the welfare in the local country. 
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The economic intuition of the result is the following. As spillovers go up, the 
monopolist serves more and more people coming from the lower income group in local 
country. We know that for the local country the lower the income index, the higher will 
be the population density. So growth rate of increase in market size is positive. CS is 
positive for the new consumers. At the same time the old consumers will buy lower 
product quality at lower price. For them CS may be negative. The ultimate effect of 
increase in spillover parameter on welfare of the local country is positive. Gain in CS of   
new consumers outweigh the loss of CS of old consumers. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have discussed the scenario where an MNC serving a good quality 
product in its own (developed) country enters into the market of a developing country to 
serve the same product not produced there before. The developing country is 
characterized by uneven income distribution where as the income distribution in 
developed country is even. This difference in income distribution leads the MNC to 
choose a lower product quality for the developing country. However the MNC possesses 
a cost advantage for producing a lower product quality for the developed country as it 
can transfer the previous knowledge of producing a higher quality called spillover effect. 
The quality difference between the countries rises as spill over effect goes up. At the 
same time the market in the developed country shrinks and that in the developing 
country expands and the total profit of the MNC goes up. This explains why the MNCs 
are so eager to enter into the developing economies. On the other hand, the higher the 
spillover effect of an MNC, the higher the welfare of the local country is. This has one 
implication to the choice of entry of firms in a developing country. In case of perfect 
information, the local government should allow entry of those firms which have larger 
spillover effects, if local welfare is the immediate concern. However this analysis may 
be extended where the MNC faces a competition from a local firm in the developing 
country. Obviously in equilibrium two firms choose two different qualities with more 
market coverage. The quality differential would depend on the specification of cost 
function of the firms. The local form may be less efficient in developing a new product 
quality appropriate under the new situation. Obviously in the absence of government 
intervention welfare of the developing country will be the sum of consumer surplus and 
net loss or gain in local firm’s profit as MNC snatches a part of its market after entry. So 
welfare effect would be different from analysis in this paper. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1.  Equilibrium  in  Local  and Foreign Country Market 
 
































































































, and  a q  
* *
0  .                    ( 1 b )  
 











































This boils down to, after substitution from 1
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First Stage 
 






f q S q
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where   S q q a
q
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After substitution of 1
st order condition of second stage we obtain 
 

















0   
q
  ,  and    0 ˆ ˆ ˆ * * * *
0    aS S q  .                         (1c) 
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2.    Comparative Static Effect of Increase in  q ˆ  on 
*
0   and 
* q  
 
Assuming  a  constant and differentiating totally each Equation of (1b) we obtain 
 
   
. 0                                                  
, ˆ 1 2
 
      
dq d








































































.    (2a) 
 
Effect of Increase in  a  on 
*
0   and 
* q 
 













































































  S S q q
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S q S q q
a
q
.        ( 2 b )  
 
3.    Comparative Static-Effect of Increase in  a on 
* ˆ q  and 
*
0 ˆ   
 
Following the analysis of Appendix 2, from (1c) we may write 






























































































q ˆ 2 ˆ
.                                       ( 3 a )  
 
4.  Effect  of  Increase  in a  on the Total Profit 
 
The first order derivative of total profit function (1a) w. r. t  a is  given  by: 
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* S S     

      , 
 
and     
* * * * * * * *
*
0
S q f S f q
CS
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                                 ( a f t e r   s u b s t i t u t i o n   f r o m   ( 2 a ) )   
 
Ultimately we obtain after substitution from (2b) 
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